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THE ADAPTIVE ADVANTAGE OF SYMBOLIC THEFT OVER SENSORIMOTOR
TOIL: GROUNDING LANGUAGE IN PERCEPTUAL CATEGORIES



Abstract
Using neural nets to simulate learning and the genetic algorithm to simulate
evolution in a toy world of mushrooms and mushroom-foragers, we place two
ways of acquiring categories into direct competition with one another: In (1)
"sensorimotor toil,” new categories are acquired through real-time, feedback-
corrected, trial and error experience in sorting them. In (2) "symbolic theft,” new
categories are acquired by hearsay from propositions – boolean combinations of
symbols describing  them. In competition, symbolic theft always beats
sensorimotor toil.  We hypothesize that this is the basis of the adaptive advantage
of language. Entry-level categories must still be learned by toil, however, to avoid
an infinite regress (the “symbol grounding problem”). Changes in the internal
representations of categories must take place during the course of learning by toil.
These changes can be analyzed in terms of the compression of within-category
similarities and the expansion of between-category differences. These allow
regions of similarity space to be separated, bounded and named, and then the
names can be combined and recombined to describe new categories, grounded
recursively in the old ones. Such compression/expansion effects, called
"categorical perception" (CP), have previously been reported with categories
acquired by sensorimotor toil; we show that they can also arise from symbolic
theft alone. The picture of natural language and its origins that emerges from this
analysis is that of a powerful hybrid symbolic/sensorimotor capacity, infinitely
superior to its purely sensorimotor precursors, but still grounded in and dependent
on them. It can spare us from untold time and effort learning things the hard way,
through direct experience, but it remain anchored in and translatable into the
language of experience.
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THE ADAPTIVE ADVANTAGE OF SYMBOLIC THEFT OVER SENSORIMOTOR
TOIL: GROUNDING LANGUAGE IN PERCEPTUAL CATEGORIES

1. Language Evolution: A Martian Perspective

Whatever the adaptive advantage of language was, it was indisputably triumphant. If all our
linguistic capabilities were subtracted from the repertoire of our species today, very little
would be left. Not only would all the fruits of science, technology and culture vanish, but our
development and socialization would be arrested at the stage still occupied currently by the
members of all other species, along with only the severely retarded members of our own.
Buried somewhere among all those undeniable benefits that we would lose if we lost language
there must be a clue to what language’s original bonus was, the competitive edge that set us
inexorably on our unique evolutionary path, distinct from all the nonspeaking species (Harnad,
Steklis & Lancaster 1976; Steels 1997).

There has been no scarcity of conjectures as to what that competitive edge might have been: It
helped us hunt; it helped us make tools; it helped us socialize. There is undoubtedly some merit
in such speculations, but it is hard to imagine how to test them. Language is famously silent in
the archeological and paleontological record, requiring interpreters to speak for it; but it is the
validity of those very interpretations that is at issue here.

Perhaps we need to take a step back, and look at our linguistic capacity from the proverbial
Martian anthropologist's perspective: Human beings clearly become capable of doing many
things in their world, and from what they can do, it can also be inferred that they know a lot
about that world. Without too much loss of generality, the Martian could describe that
knowledge as being about the kinds of things there are in the world, and what to do with them.
In other words, the knowledge is knowledge of categories: objects, events, states, properties
and actions.

Where do those categories come from? A Martian anthropologist with a sufficiently long-range
database could not fail to notice that some of our categories we already have at birth or soon
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after, whereas others we acquire through our interactions with the world (Harnad, 1976). By
analogy with the concept of wealth, the Martian might describe the categories acquired
through the efforts of a lifetime to be those that are earned through honest toil, whereas those
that we are born with and hence not required to earn he might be tempted to regard as ill-
gotten gains -- unless his database was really very long-range, in which case he would notice
that even our inborn categories had to be earned through honest toil: not our own individual
toil, nor even that of our ancestors, but that of a more complicated, collective phenomenon
that our (ingenious) Martian anthropologist might want to call evolution.

So, relieved that none of our categories were acquired other than through honest toil, our
Martian might take a close look at precisely what we had done to earn those that we did not
inherit. He would find that the way we earned our categories was through laborious, real-time
trial and error, guided by corrective feedback from the consequences of sorting things correctly
or incorrectly (Catania & Harnad, 1988). As in many cases the basis for sorting things
correctly was far from obvious, he would note that our honest toil was underwritten by a
substantial inborn gift, that of eventually being able to find the basis for sorting things
correctly, somehow. A brilliant cognitive theorist, our Martian would immediately deduce that
in our heads there must be a very powerful device for learning to detect those critical features
of things (as projected onto our sensory surfaces) on the basis of which they can be
categorized correctly (Harnad, 1996b). Hence he would not be surprised that this laborious
process takes time and effort -- time and effort he would call "acquiring categories by
Sensorimotor Toil" (henceforth Toil).

Our Martian moralist would be surprised, however, indeed shocked, that the vast majority of
our categories turn out not to be learned by Toil after all, even after discounting the ones we
are born with. At first the Martian thinks that these unearned categories simply appear
spontaneously; but upon closer inspection of his data he deduces that we must in fact be
stealing  them from one another somehow. For whenever there is evidence that one of us has
acquired a new category without first having performed the prerequisite hours, weeks or years
of Toil, in the laborious real-time cycle of trial, error and feedback, there is always a relatively
brief vocal episode between that individual and another one who has himself either previously
earned that category through sensorimotor Toil, or has had a very brief vocal encounter with
yet another individual who has himself either… and so on.
5

Without blinking, our Martian dubs this violation of his own planet's Protestant work ethic "the
acquisition of categories by Theft," and immediately begins to search for the damage done to
the victims of this heinous epistemic crime. To his surprise, however, he finds that (except in
very rare cases, dubbed "plagiarism," in which the thief falsely claims to have acquired the
stolen category through his own honest toil), category Theft seems to be largely a victimless
crime.

Ever the brilliant cognitive theorist, our Martian would quickly discern that the mechanism
underlying Theft must be related to the one underlying Toil, and that in principle it was all
quite simple. The clue was in the vocal episode: All earthlings start with an initial repertoire of
categories acquired by sensorimotor Toil (supplemented by some inborn ones); these
categories are grounded by the internal mechanism that learns to detect their distinguishing
features from their sensorimotor projections. These grounded  categories are then assigned an
arbitrary symbolic name (lately a vocal one, but long ago a gestural one, his database tells him
[Steklis & Harnad, 1976]). This name resembles neither the members of the category, nor their
features, nor is it part of any instrumental action that one might perform on the members of the
category. It is an arbitrary symbol, of a kind with which our Martian theorist is already quite
familiar with, from his knowledge of the eternal Platonic truths of logic and mathematics, valid
everywhere in the Universe, which can all be encoded in formal symbolic notation (Harnad,
1990).

When our Martian analyses more closely the brief vocal interactions that always seem to
mediate Theft, he finds that they can always be construed in the form of a proposition that has
been heard by the thief. A proposition is just a series of symbols that can be interpreted as
making a claim that can be either true or false. The Martian knows that propositions can
always be interpreted as statements about category membership. He quickly deduces that
propositions make it possible to acquire new categories in the form of recombinations of old
ones, as long as all the symbols for the old categories are already grounded in Toil (individual
or evolutionary). He accordingly conjectures that the adaptive advantage of language is
specifically the advantage of Symbolic Theft over Sensorimotor Toil, a victimless crime that
allows knowledge to be acquired without the risks or costs of direct trial and error experience.
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Can the adaptive advantage of Symbolic Theft over Sensorimotor Toil be demonstrated
without the benefit of the Martian Anthropologist's evolutionary database (in which he can
review at leisure the videotape of the real-time origins of language)? We will try to
demonstrate them in a computer simulated toy world considerably more impoverished than the
one studied by the Martian. It will be a world consisting of mushrooms and mushroom foragers
who must learn what to do with which kind of mushroom in order to survive and reproduce
(Parisi, Cecconi & Nolfi, 1990; Cangelosi & Parisi, 1998). This artificial-life approach to
modeling language evolution has itself evolved appreciably in the last decade (Cangelosi &
Parisi, 2002; Kirby, 2000; Steels, 1997;) and is based on languages whose terms are grounded
in the objects in the simulated world (Steels, 2002; Cangelosi, 2001; Steels & Kaplan, 1999).

Before we describe the simulation we must introduce some theoretical considerations that are
too fallible to be attributed to our Martian theorist: One concerns a fundamental limitation on
the acquisition of categories by Symbolic Theft (the symbol grounding problem) and the other
concerns the mechanism underlying the acquisition of categories by Sensorimotor Toil
(categorical perception).

1.1.  The Symbol Grounding Problem
Just as the values of the tokens in a currency system cannot be based on still further tokens of
currency in the system, on pain of infinite regress -- needing instead to be grounded in
something like a gold standard or some other material resource that has face-value -- so the
meanings of the tokens in a symbol system cannot be based on just further symbol-tokens in
the system. This is called the symbol grounding problem (Harnad, 1990). Our candidate for the
face-valid groundwork of meaning is perceptual categories. The meanings of symbols can
always be cashed into further symbols, but ultimately they must be cashed into something in
the world that the symbols denote. Whatever it is inside a symbol system that allows it to pick
out the things its symbols are about, on the basis of sensorimotor interactions with them
(Harnad, 1992; 1995), will ground those symbols; those grounded symbols can then be
combined and recombined in higher-level symbolic transactions that inherit the meanings of the
ground-level symbols. A simple example is "zebra," a higher-level symbol that can inherit its
meaning from the symbols "striped" and "horse," provided "striped" and "horse" are either
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ground-level symbols, or grounded recursively in ground-level symbols by this same means
(Harnad 1996a; Cangelosi, Greco & Harnad, 2001).

The key to this hierarchical system of inheritance is the fact that most if not all symbolic
expressions can be construed as propositions about set (i.e., category) membership. Our
Martian had immediately intuited this: The simplest proposition "P," which merely asserts that
the truth-value of P is true, is asserting that P belongs to the set of true propositions and not
the set of false propositions. In the classical syllogism: "All men are Mortal. Socrates is a Man.
Therefore Socrates is Mortal," it is again transparent that these are all propositions about
category membership. It requires only a little more reflection to construe all the sentences in
this paragraph in the same way, and even to redraw them as Venn Diagrams depicting set
membership and set inclusion. Perceptual categories are the gold standard  for this network of
abstractions that leads, bottom-up, from "horse," "striped" and "zebra" all the way to
"goodness," "truth" and "beauty."

1.2. Categorical Perception
Can perceptual categories bear the weight of grounding an entire symbolic edifice of
abstraction? Some parts of the world that our senses must categorize and tag with a symbolic
name do obligingly sort themselves into disjunct, discrete categories that admit of no overlap
or confusion, so our senses can duly detect and distinguish them. For these happy categories it
does look as if the perceptual groundwork can bear the burden. But in those parts of the world
where there is anything approaching the "blooming, buzzing confusion" that William James
wrote about, the world alone, and passive senses (or even active, moving, Gibsonian ones;
Gibson, 1979) are not enough. Here even an active sensorimotor system needs help in
detecting the invariants in the sensorimotor interaction with the world that afford the ability to
sort the subtler, more confusable things into their proper categories. Neural networks are
natural candidates for the mechanism that can learn to detect the invariants in the sensorimotor
flux that will eventually allow things to be sorted correctly (Harnad, 1992; 1993). This is the
process we have agreed to call Toil.

A sensorimotor system with human-scale category learning capacities must be a plastic
(modifiable) one: Inside the system, the internal representations of categories must be able to
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change in such a way as to sort themselves, reliably and correctly. It is perhaps an
oversimplification to think of these internal representations as being embedded in a great,
multidimensional similarity space, in which things position themselves in terms of their
distances from one another, but this simplification is behind the many regularities that have
been revealed by the psychophysical method of multidimensional scaling (Livingston &
Andrews, 1995) which has been applied to category learning and representation in human
subjects (Andrews, Livingston & Harnad, 1998). What has been found is that during the
course of category learning by what we have called sensorimotor Toil, the structure of internal
similarity space changes in such a way as to compress the perceived differences between
members of the same category and expand  the differences between members of different
categories, with the effect of separating categories in similarity space that were highly
interconfusable prior to the Toil (Andrews, Livingston & Harnad, 1998; Goldstone, 1994;
Pevtzow & Harnad, 1997). This compression/separation in turn allows an all-or-none
(categorical) boundary to be placed between the regions of similarity space occupied by
members of different categories, thereby allowing them to be assigned distinct symbolic names.

These compression/separation effect has come to be called categorical perception (CP)
(Harnad 1987) and has been observed with both inborn categories and learnt ones, in human
subjects (Goldstone, 1994; Pevtzow & Harnad, 1997) as well as in animals and in neural nets
(Cangelosi, Greco & Harnad, 2001; Harnad, Hanson & Lubin 1991; 1995; Nakisa & Plunkett,
1998; Tijsseling & Harnad, 1997). The neural nets offer the advantage that they give us an idea
of what the functional role of CP might be, and what they suggest is that CP occurs in the
service of categorization. It can be seen, for example, as changes in the receptive fields of
hidden units in the supervised backpropagation nets that will be used in this study. What will be
analyzed for the first time here is how the CP "warping" of similarity space that occurs when
categories are acquired by sensorimotor Toil is transferred and further warped when categories
are acquired by Theft. Categorical perception induced by language can thus be seen as an
instance of the Whorfian Hypothesis (Whorf 1964), according to which our language
influences the way the world looks to us.


2. The Mushroom World
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Our simulations take place in a mushroom world (Cangelosi & Parisi, 1998; Harnad, 1987) in
which little virtual organisms forage among the mushrooms, learning what to do with them
(eat or don't eat, mark or don't mark, return or don't return). The foragers feed, reproduce and
die. They must learn that mushrooms with feature A (i.e. those with black spots on their tops,
as illustrated in Figure 1) are to be eaten; mushrooms with feature B (i.e. a dark stalk) are to
have their location marked, and mushrooms with both features A and B (i.e. both black-
spotted top and dark stalk) are to be eaten, marked and returned to. All mushrooms also have
three irrelevant features, C, D and E, which the foragers must learn to ignore.

Apart from being able to move around in the environment and to learn to categorize the
mushrooms they encounter, the foragers also have the ability to vocalize. When they approach
a mushroom, they (innately) emit a call associated with what they are about to do to that
mushroom (EAT, MARK). The correct action pattern (eat, mark), coupled (innately) with the
correct call (EAT, MARK) are learned during the foragers' lifetime through supervised
learning (Sensorimotor Toil). Under some conditions, the foragers also receive as input, over
and above the features of the mushroom itself (+/-A, +/-B, +/-C, +/-D, +/-E), the call of
another forager. This will be used to test the adaptive role of the Theft strategy. Note,
however, that in the present simulations the thief  steals only the knowledge, not the mushroom
(cf. note 1 for simulations on environments with shared resources).

The foragers' world is a 2-dimensional (2D) grid of 400 cells (20x20). The environment
contains 40 randomly located mushrooms, 10 per category. Mushrooms are grouped in four
categories according to the presence/absence of features A and B: 00, A0, 0B, and AB (Figure
1). In each world there are 40 mushrooms: 10 instances of each of the four categories. Our
ecological interpretation of the marking  behavior is that it has two functions: Both the inedible
0B and the edible AB mushrooms have a toxin that is painful when inhaled, but digging into
the earth (marking) immediately after exposure blocks all negative effects. There is also a
delayed contingency on the AB mushrooms only, which is that wherever they appear, many
more mushrooms of the same kind will soon grow in their place. So with AB mushrooms it is
adaptive to remember to return to the marked spots.
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Figure 1: 2D world with one forager and the four samples of mushrooms. Mushroom
feature A is the presence of black dots on the top; feature B is a dark stalk. Mushroom
position corresponds to the normalized relative angle between forager's orientation and
the closest mushroom.

Feature A is the black-spotted top and feature B is the dark stalk. Mushroom position is
encoded as the normalized relative angle between the direction the forager is facing and the
direction of the closest mushroom. In this simulation, the foraging is done by only one forager
at a time. As it moves, the forager perceives only the closest mushroom. For each mushroom,
the input to the forager consists of the 5 +/- features plus its location relative to the forager,
expressed as the angle α, between its position and the direction the forager is facing. The angle
is then normalized to the interval [0, 1]. The five visual features A, B, C, D, E are encoded in a
binary localist representation consisting of five units each of which encodes the
presence/absence of one feature. An A0 mushroom would be encoded as 10***, with 1
standing for the presence of feature A, 0 for the absence of feature B and *** being either 0 or
1 for the 3 irrelevant features, C, D, and E. 0B mushrooms are encoded as 01***, and AB as
11***. The calls that can be produced in the presence of the mushroom are also encoded in a
localist binary system. There are 3 units for each of the three calls: 1** EAT, *1* MARK and
**1 RETURN, so EAT+MARK+RETURN would be 111. Like the Calls, the three actions of
eating, marking and returning are encoded with localist units.
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3. The Neural Network and Genetic Algorithm

The forager's neural network processes the sensory information about the closest mushroom
and activates the output units corresponding to the movement, action and call patterns. The net
has a feedforward architecture (Figure 2) with 8 input, 5 hidden and 8 output units. The first
input unit encodes the angle to the closest mushroom. Five input units encode the visual
features and three input units encode incoming calls (if any). Two output units encode the four
possible movements (one step forward, turn 90 degrees right, turn 90 degrees left, or stay in
place) in binary. Three action units encode the action patterns eat, mark, and return, and three
call units encode the corresponding three calls, EAT, MARK, and RETURN.



Figure 2 - Neural network architecture.

A forager's lifetime lasts for 2000 actions (100 actions in 20 epochs). Each epoch consists of
sampling a different distribution of 40 mushrooms. Each action consists of two spreads of
activation in the neural network, one for the action (movement and action/call) and one for an
imitation task. The forager first produces a movement and an action/call output using the input
information from the physical features of the mushroom. The forager's neural network then
undergoes a cycle of learning based on the backpropagation algorithm (Rumelhart, Hinton &
Williams, 1986).
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The net's action and call outputs are compared with what they should have been; this difference
is then backpropagated so as to weaken incorrect connections and strengthen correct ones. In
this way the forager learns to categorize the mushrooms by performing the correct action and
call. In the second spread of activation the forager also learns to imitate the call. It receives as
input only the correct call for that kind of mushroom, which it must imitate in its call output
units. This learning is likewise supervised by backpropagation.

The population of foragers is also subject to selection and reproduction as generated by the
genetic algorithm (Goldberg, 1989). The population size is 100 foragers and remains constant
across generations. The initial population consists of 100 neural nets with a random weight
matrix. During the forager's lifetime its individual fitness is computed according to a formula
that assigns points for each time a forager reaches a mushroom and performs the right action
on it (eat/mark/return) according to features A and B. At the beginning of its life, a forager
does not become much fitter from the first mushrooms it encounters because it takes some
time to learn to categorize them correctly. As errors decrease, the forager's fitness increases.
At the end of their life-cycles, the 20 foragers with the highest fitness in each generation are
selected and allowed to reproduce by engendering 5 offspring each. The new population of
100 (20x5) newborns is subject to random mutation of their initial connection weights for the
motor behavior, as well as for the actions and calls (thick arrows in Figure 2); in other words,
there is neither any Lamarckian inheritance of learned weights nor any Baldwinian evolution of
initial weights to set them closer to the final stage of the learning of 00, A0, 0B and AB
categories. This selection cycle is repeated until the final generation.

4. Grounding Eat  and Mark  Directly Through Toil

Two experimental conditions were compared: Toil and Theft. Foragers live for two life-stages
of 2000 actions each. The first life-stage is identical for both populations: they all learn,
through sensorimotor Toil, to eat mushrooms with feature A and to mark mushrooms with
feature B. (AB mushrooms are accordingly both eaten and marked.) Return is not taught
during the first life-stage. The input is always the mushroom's position and features, as shown
in Table 1. In the second life-stage, foragers in the Toil condition go on to learn to return to
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AB mushrooms in the same way they had learned to eat and mark them through honest toil:
trial and error supervised by the consequences of returning or not returning (Catania & Harnad
1988). In contrast, foragers in the Theft condition learn to return on the basis of hearing the
vocalization of the mushrooms' names.


Table 1 - Input and backpropagation for Toil and Theft learning and for imitation learning

Condition
Feature
Input
Call
Input
Behavior
Backprop
Call
Backprop
TOIL EAT-MARK YES NO YES YES
TOIL RETURN YES NO YES YES
THEFT RETURN NO YES YES YES
IMITATION NO YES NO YES


We ran ten replications for each of the two conditions. In the first 200 generations, the
foragers only live for the first life-stage. From generation 200 to generation 210 they live on
for a second life-stage and must learn the return behavior. The first 200 generations are
necessary to evolve and stabilize the ability to explore the world and to approach mushrooms.
After the foragers are able to move in the 2D environment and to approach mushrooms, they
learn the basic categories plus their names, EAT and MARK. The average fitness of the ten
replications is shown in Figure 3. The populations that evolve in these 10 runs are the same
ones that are then used in the Toil and Theft conditions from generations 200 to 210.
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Figure 3 - Average fitness of the best 20 individuals in ten replications. Foragers lived
one life-stage and only eating and marking was taught.



In the next runs, the second life-stage differs for the Toil and Theft groups: The Toil group
learns to return and to vocalize RETURN on the basis of the feature input alone, as in the
previous life-stage. Their input and supervision conditions are shown in Table 1. In the Theft
condition the foragers rely on other foragers' calls to learn to return. They do not receive the
feature input, only the vocalization input.

Our hypothesis is that the Theft strategy is more adaptive (i.e. results in greater fitness and
more mushroom collection) than the Toil strategy. To test this, we compare foragers' behavior
for the two conditions statistically. For our purposes we count the number of AB mushrooms
that are correctly returned to. The average of the best 20 foragers in all 10 replications is 54.7
AB mushrooms for Theft and 44.1 for Toil. That is, Thieves successfully return to more AB
mushrooms than do Toilers. This means that learning to return from the grounded names EAT
and MARK is more adaptive than learning it through direct toil based on sampling the physical
features of the mushrooms. To compare the two conditions, we performed a repeated
measures analysis of variance (MANOVA) on the 10 seeds. The dependent variables were the
number of AB mushrooms collected at generation 210 averaged over the 20 fittest individuals
in all 10 generations. The independent variable was Theft vs. Toil. The difference between the
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two conditions was significant [F(1,9)=136.7 p<0.0001]. Means and standard deviations are
shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4 - Mean number of AB mushrooms correctly returned to in Toil and Theft
simulations

5. Theft vs Toil: Simulating Direct Competition

A direct way to study the adaptive advantage of Theft over Toil is to see how they fare in
competition against one another. We ran 10 competitive simulations, using the genotypes of
generation 200 from the previous 10 runs. From generation 201 to 220, the 100 foragers of
each population are randomly divided into 50 Thieves and 50 Toilers for the learning to return.
There is no real on-line competition in our simulations because in each run, only one individual
is tested in its world. The number of AB mushrooms to which a forager is able to return will
strongly affect its fitness. Direct competition occurs only at the end of the life cycle, in the
selection of the fittest 20 to reproduce. Direct competition for variable mushroom resources in
shared environments has been studied separately in other simulations (note 1); in the present
ecology, the assumption is that mushrooms are abundant and that the only fitness challenge is
to emerge among the top 20 eaters/markers of the generation. Figure 5 shows the proportion
of Thieves in the overall population of the 10 replications of Theft vs Toil (from generation
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200 to 220). Even though Thieves are only 50% of the population at generation 201, they
gradually come to outnumber Toilers, so that in less than 10 generations the whole population
consists of Thieves.
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Figure 5 - Percentage of Thieves in the 10 competitive simulations.


6. What Changes During Learning? Analysis of Internal Representations

In this section we compare the changes in the foragers' hidden-unit representations for the
mushrooms to determine what it is that changes internally during Toil and Theft. The
activations of the 5 hidden units are recorded during a test cycle in which the forager is
exposed to all the mushrooms as input. We will report the analysis of a single case study using
the network of the fittest individual in seed 8. These results are representative of the learning
dynamics in all nets that successfully learned to categorize mushrooms.

We first used Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to display the network's internal states in
two dimensions, thereby reducing the 5 activations to 2 factor scores. PCA, however, has the
limitation that the different conditions cannot be compared directly because of differences in
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scale. For each PCA, factor scores are normalized to a distribution with a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1. Hence this analysis can only be used to compare internal
representations within each condition, not between conditions.
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Figure 6 - Similarity space for network with random weights. Factors are obtained after
PCA on the activation values of the five hidden units.
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Figure 7 - Similarity space for network that learned to eat, mark, and return by Toil.
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Figure 6 and 7 show the effect of category learning (Toil) on the distances between the internal
representations of the mushrooms in hidden unit similarity space. In Figure 6, prior to Toil, the
four kinds of mushroom are not clearly distinguishable. During the course of learning the
actions/calls eat-mark-return, the representations form four separable clusters. We will now
show how these representations can be used to analyze the effects of Toil and Theft learning
on similarity space directly.

7. Categorical Perception Effects

The change in our networks' hidden-unit representations during the course of category learning
can be analyzed and understood in terms of learned categorical perception (CP) effects
(Harnad 1987, Goldstone 1994; Andrews et al., 1998), i.e. the compression of within-category
distances and the expansion of between-category distances. CP has already been demonstrated
to occur with Toil learning (Harnad et al., 1991; 1995; Goldstone et al., 1996; Csato et al.,
submitted); we will now extend this to an examination of what happens to the internal
representations with Theft learning.

To overcome the limitations of the previous principal component analysis, we record the
Euclidean distances between and within categories using the coordinates of the five hidden unit
activations directly. At the end of each simulation, the 5 fittest foragers in each population are
tested by giving them 40-mushroom samples as input. The hidden unit activations for each kind
of mushroom are saved for three input conditions: (1) Features-only (only the 5-bit feature
input); (2) Calls-only (only the 3-bit call input) and (3) Features+Calls (both types of input).
The within-category distances are calculated as the mean squared Euclidean distances between
each individual mushroom's coordinates and its category mean. There are four means, one for
00, A0, 0B, and AB respectively. These parameters reflect the within-category similarity
amongst the members of each category: the lower the average within-category distance for a
category, the more similar the hidden-unit representations of its members. Between-category
distances are calculated as the distances between the category means. These reflect the
dissimilarity between the members of different categories: the higher the average between-
19
category distance for a pair of categories, the greater the difference between the hidden-unit
representations of their respective members.

Four learning conditions are used to analyze within-category and between-category distances
for CP effects: (1) Pre-learning, for random-weight nets before learning; (2) No-return, for
nets that were only taught to eat and to call EAT, and to mark and to call MARK, (3) Toil, for
nets that also learned to return and to call RETURN with feature input, (4) and Theft for
learning to return from calls alone. In every replication one mean was obtained for each of the
10 between- and within-category distances (4 within measures for each category, plus 6
between measures for all the possible pairings of the 4 categories) by averaging the distances
derived from the 5 fittest foragers. These 10 mean distances were collected for each of the
three input conditions. Because we have 10 replications, the 10 means for each distance can be
used as dependent variables in two separate analyses of variance, one for within-category, the
other for between-category distances. Our MANOVA for the within-category distances had
two independent variables: LEARNING CONDITIONS with 3 levels (Pre, No, Toil) and
CATEGORY TYPE with 4 levels (Eat, Mark, Return, Do-nothing) (note 2).

We used a repeated measure MANOVA because all levels of CATEGORY TYPE and
LEARNING CONDITIONS involve repeated measures in the same set of nets. (We excluded
the Theft condition in which the within-category distance is 0 because all ten samples of
mushrooms use the same call input.) The chart of the average within-category distances in the
4x3 conditions is shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8 - Average within-category distances in the three conditions. The curve for Mark
is not shown because it coincides with the curve for Eat.


The two main effects are statistically significant ( F(2,18)=917.6 and p<0.00001 for
LEARNING and F(3,27)=18.8 and p<0.00001 for CATEGORY TYPE); the interaction is not
significant. Using the post-hoc Duncan test with a significance threshold of p<.01 to compare
the means for each independent variable, all the comparisons in the LEARNING condition
were significant. That is, within-category distances decrease significantly from Pre-learning to
No-return to Toil. The biggest decrease is between the (random) Pre-learning and all the post-
learning nets (Figure 8). In the four levels of CATEGORY TYPE, all means differ from each
other except the Eat and Mark within-distances. That is, the within-category distance for Eat
and Mark is the same, whereas the within distance of Do-nothing is the biggest and that of
Return the smallest.

MANOVA for the between-category distances had two repeated variables: LEARNING
CONDITIONS with 4 levels (Pre, No, Toil, Theft) and CATEGORY COMPARISONS with 4
levels (Eat Versus Mark, Eat vs Return, Eat vs Do-nothing, Return vs Do-nothing). The Mark
vs Return and Mark vs Do-nothing comparisons are not included in the analysis because their
means are very similar to the parallel comparisons Eat vs Return and Eat vs Do-nothing,
respectively (Table 2). We then go on to generalize the results for the Eat vs Mark
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comparisons. The between-category distances for the 4x4 repeated measure design are shown
in Table 2 and Figure 9.

Table 2 - Table of means for the MANOVA of within-category distances
COMPARISON PRE NO-RET TOIL THEFT
EAT ↔ MARK .57 1.47 1.47 1.42
RETURN ↔ EAT  .42 1.01 1.10 1.25
RETURN ↔ MARK .39 1.01 1.12 1.25
EAT ↔ Do-nothing  .42 1.04 1.02 .93
MARK ↔ Do-nothing  .45 1.04 1.02 .95
RETURN ↔ Do-nothing  .54 1.42 1.52 1.61




0
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Return Vs Do-nothing
Eat Vs Mark
Eat Vs Do-nothing

Figure 9 - Between-category distances in the four conditions. Return vs Mark and Mark
vs Do-nothing are not shown because they are congruent with Return vs Eat and Eat vs
Do-nothing respectively.


The two main effects are significant ( F(3,27)=3771.6 and p<0.00001 for LEARNING and
F(3,27)=868.6 and p<0.00001 for COMPARISONS) as is their interaction (F(9,81)=75.7 and
22
p<.00001). Duncan tests revealed, first, a significant difference in the distance between the
Pre-learning nets and all the post-learning nets. (This expected effect only shows that any kind
of systematic learning will increase between-category distances compared to random initial
distances.) Comparing Toil vs Theft specifically, we see that all distances between Return and
the other three categories are greater in the Theft nets. Learning Return by Theft has the effect
of separating this category more from the others. The mean differences were all significant for
Return vs Eat, Return vs Mark, and Return vs Do-nothing, 1.25, 1.25 and 1.25, respectively,
in the Theft nets, and 1.10, 1.12, and 1.52 in the Toil nets. The Theft learning of Return caused
the between-category distances not involving Return to decrease. [A last effect is that in all
learning conditions the Eat vs Mark and Return vs Do-nothing distances are greater then the
other pairs because the Hamming distances of their I/O codes are maximal (e.g. features A and
B for Eat Vs Mark have the input contrast: 10 Vs 01).]

Figure 10 shows the change in the distances between the internal representations of the A (Eat
only), B (Mark only), A&B (Eat & Mark & Return), and not-A&not-B (neither Mark nor Eat
nor Return) Mushrooms. Prior to Toil, the circles, proportional to the within-category
distances, are large, and the rectangle, proportional to the between-category distances is small.
After Toil learning, the within-category differences shrink and the between-category distances
expand.

Figure 11 then traces the between-category expansion to Theft Learning: The thin dashed
rectangle is proportional to the between-category distances before learning (random). The
thick dashed line is what they look like after Toil learning of Eat and Mark without Return; the
thin continuous line is identical to Figure 9, that is, Toil learning of Eat and Mark, with Return,
and the thick continuous line is for Theft learning of Return. Note the increased separation
between A&B and not-A&not-B induced by Theft alone.
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Figure 10 - 2D projections of between-category distances (quadrilateral sides) and within-
category distances (circle radius) in the Pre-learning condition and after Toil learning of
Eat, Mark,and Return. All distances except Eat vs Mark correspond to the actual
Euclidean distances in 5 dimensional hidden unit space.
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Figure 11 - 2D projections of the between-category distances (quadrilateral sides) in the
four conditions. All distances, except Eat vs Mark, are comparable and reflect the actual
Euclidean distances between categories (cf. length legend). Note that the distances
between Return and all the other categories (Return vs Eat, Return vs Mark, Return vs
Do-nothing) are the highest in the Theft condition.


8. Conclusions

We have shown that a strategy of acquiring new categories by Symbolic Theft completely
outperforms a strategy of acquiring them by Sensorimotor Toil as long as it is grounded in
categories acquired by Toil. The internal mechanism that makes both kinds of category
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acquisition possible does so by deforming or “warping” internal similarity space so as to
compress the internal representation of members of the same category and to separate those of
different categories. The warping occurs primarily in the service of Toil, but Theft not only
inherits the warped similarity space but can warp it further. This warping of similarity space in
the service of sensorimotor and symbolic learning is called categorical perception and can be
interpreted as a form of Whorfian effect (Whorf, 1964) in which language influences how the
world looks to us.

From the standpoint of our Martian anthropologist, the influence would run roughly like this:
All other species on this planet get their categories by toil alone, either cumulative,
evolutionary toil or individual lifetime toil: Individuals encounter things, must learn by trial and
error what to do with what, and to do so, they must form internal representations that reliably
sort things into their proper categories. In the process of doing so, they keep learning to see
the world differently, detecting the invariants, compressing the similarities and enhancing the
differences that allow them to sort things the way they need to be sorted, guided by feedback
from the consequences of sorting adaptively and maladaptively (as in the mushroom world).

That’s how it proceeded on our planet until one species discovered a better way: First acquire
an entry-level set of categories the honest way, like everyone else, but then assign them
arbitrary names. (Those names could start as nonarbitrary functional or imitative gestures at
first, by-products of practical, collective social actions or even deliberate mimicry, but their
nonarbitrary features would be irrelevant once they were used just to name; and vocal gestures
would be least encumbered with other practical tasks, hence most readily available for arbitrary
naming, especially across distances, out of eye-shot, and in the dark.) Once the entry-level
categories had accompanying names, the whole world of combinatory possibilities opened up
and a lively trade in new categories could begin (probably more in the spirit of barter than
theft, and, within a kin-line, one of sharing categories along with other goods). In trading
categories as they traded combinations of symbols, our species also traded “world-views,” for
each category acquired by hearsay also brought with it some rearrangement of the internal
representation of categories, a “warping” that was Whorfian, whether merely the subtle
compression that results from learning that A is always conjoined with B, or the fundamental
restructuring dictated by a radical scientific discovery.
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Only our Martian knows the specific initial conditions in which the generative power of names
and their boolean combinations made themselves felt biologically on our planet, but perhaps
our simulations suggest how its benefits might have mushroomed, inducing a series of
Baldwinian adaptations inclining ever our successful ancestors to name categories and to string
names together so as to describe new categories to one another with ever more fervor and
commitment.

Can results from a 3-bit toy world really cast light on the rich and complex phenomenon of the
origin and adaptive value of natural language? This is really a question about whether such
findings will “scale up” to human size in the real world. This scaling problem -- common to
most fields of cognitive modeling where the tasks themselves tend not to be lifesize or to have
face validity -- can only be solved by actually trying to scale our models upward, incorporating
more and more of the real-world complexity and constraints into them. This is how our own
research program will continue. In this paper, however, we wanted to enter our own toy
candidate into the competition with the other toy models (tool-make, hunt-help, chit-chat, etc.;
Knight et al., 2000) for the provenance of our species’ most powerful and remarkable trait. In
other work, we have investigated categorical perception with continuous stimuli (Tijsseling &
Harnad, 1997), the transfer of grounding to higher-order categories (Cangelosi, Greco &
Harnad, 2001) and the emergence of syntax and compositional languages (e.g. Cangelosi,
2001).
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Notes

(1) In simulations conducted by Emma Smith and Gianni Valenti (unpublished data, BSc
Theses, Department of Psychology, University of Southampton, 1997) we have shown that
when the scarcity of the mushrooms is varied, Theft beats Toil when there are plenty of
mushrooms for everyone, but when the mushrooms are scarce and vocalizing risks losing
the mushroom to the Thief, Toil beats Theft and the foragers are mute. Further studies
analyzing kinship showed that under conditions of scarcity vocalizing to relatives only
beats vocalizing to everyone. Of course a mushroom world is too simple, and foraging
categories are not the only ones that can benefit from Theft. The pattern may be different
for categories related to danger, territory, mating, dominance, or instructing offspring.
(2) We will use the names Eat, Mark, Return, and Do-nothing (i.e. non-A, non-B mushrooms)
to refer to the four categories. Return categories could also be called Eat+Mark+Return
because the Return category implies the co-occurrence of behaviors/calls Eat and Mark
